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COMMENT
Consumer Credit Legislation and the Banking Industry
American banking history is checkered with various panics and recessions
as well as the near-fatal Great Depression. Banks have traditionally been heavily
regulated, partly as a result of the historical propensity for banks to lead serious
downturns in the economy and partly because of the banking industry's sacred
duty as principal guardian of society's monetary assests. Historically, bank
regulation has not focused primarily on the bank-customer relationship; in-
stead, it has focused on the financial stability and viability of the bank itself.'
The pattern of major federal noninvolvement in the bank-customer rela-
tionship came to an abrupt halt in the late 1960s with the passage of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act which included, among other things, the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA).2 The stated purpose of the TILA is "to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit. ' 3 The Act signified an underlying shift in
philosophy from "let the borrower beware" to "let the [lender] disclose." 4
The net result to the banking industry was that banks could for the first time
face substantial liability because of the way they handled their lending
transactions.
The legislation was undoubtedly enacted in response to the problems and
complexities associated with the rapid growth of consumer credit and con-
sumer credit instruments.- However, the Act created its own problems and
1. Banks were not really regulated for safety and soundness by the federal government until
the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, which, among other things, gave both the Comp-
troller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve System authority to supervise and examine member
banks. After more than half of the banks in the nation failed during the Great Depression of
the 1930s, Congress enacted legislation that: (1) created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) to insure deposits; (2) allowed the FDIC to examine all insured banks; (3) prohibited
the payment of interest on demand deposits; (4) limited interest payable on time deposits; (5)
prohibited banks from engaging in most investment banking activities; (6) established chartering
requirements; and (7) allowed the Federal Reserve Board to set reserve requirements. K. SPoNG,
BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPIEKaNTATION, AND EFECTS 16-21 (2d ed. 1985). However,
some regulation of the bank-customer relationship is long-standing. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1982).
Although this comment speaks in terms of banks and banking, the discussion is equally
applicable to other financial institutions such as savings and loans and credit unions.
2. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 146, 146-167 (1968).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
4. Black, Truth in Lending After Simplification, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 236 (1986).
5. K. SPONO, supra note 1, at 127.
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complexities.6 By 1980, there had been some 14,000 lawsuits filed under the
TILA,7
Besides the TILA, the Consumer Credit Protection Act has been amended
several times in the past few years to add additional consumer credit legisla-
tion. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) was added in 1970.8 Then, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)9 and the Fair Credit Billing Act
(FCBA)'0 were added in 1974. Finally, the Debt Collection Practices Act
(DCPA) was enacted in 1977.11 Enforcement power under these acts is given
generally to the Federal Trade Commission while the Federal Reserve Board
is generally responsible for the promulgation of regulations.' 2
In 1974, Congress enacted the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA), which was another consumer disclosure statute. 3 This statute,
however, deal,; with the disclosure of real estate settlement costs. 14 RESPA
was enacted to "insure that consumers throughout the Nation are provided
with greater arid more timely information on the nature and costs of the set-
tlement process and are protected from unnecessarily high settlement charges
caused by certain abusive practices.""
As if the statutes alone did not produce enough complexity for bankers,
Congress also empowered the promulgation of regulations under the various
6. See Garvood, Truth-In-Lending After Two Years, 89 BANKs.No L.J. 1 (1972); Griffith,
Recent Developments in the Effort to Simplify Truth in Lending, 19 TULSA L.J. 30 (1983).
7. F. MLa E & B. CtAR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER PROTECTON 199 (1980).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982).
9. Id. §§ 1691-1691f.
10. Id. §§ 666-1666j.
11. Id. §§ 1.692-1692o. The Consumer Credit Protection Act also contains two other con-
sumer statutes--the Consumer Leasing Act, id. §§ 1667-1677, and the Electronic Fund Transfers
Act, id. §§ 1693-1693r. Although these acts can certainly apply to banks, they will not be discussed
because they do not normally directly impact on a bank's consumer lending practices.
12. Id. §§ 1604, 1607, 1681s, 1691b, 1691c, 16921. See also Haiverson, Consumer Credit Regula-
tion and the Federal Trade Commission, 90 BANK NG L.J. 479 (1973).
13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1982).
14. A somewhat related statute that deals with interstate land sales and imposes certain
disclosure requirements and contains certain prohibitions is the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act of 1968. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982).
Two other federal statutes that deal with mortgage lending are the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1982), and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA),
id. §§ 2901-2905. The HMDA requires mortgage lenders (both purchasers and originators) to
compile data with respect to the number and total dollar amount of mortgage loans originated
and purchased by the institution during each fiscal year. Id. § 2803(a). The CRA provides that
federal financial surervisory agencies (i.e., the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board) shall assess the financial institution's record for meeting the entire commu-
nity's credit neels consistent with the safe and sound operation of the institution. Id. § 2903(1).
This record is then required to be taken into account in evaluation of an application by the
facility for a national charter; initial deposit insurance; permission to establish a branch; permis-
sion to relocate, and permission to merge, acquire assets, or assume the liabilities of another
financial institution under 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) or section 408(e) of the National Housing Act
[12 U.S.C. § 1730a(e)]. Id. § 2903(2).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
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consumer credit statutes." The result has been that banks have been bom-
barded by various regulations such as Regulation Z for the TILA,'7 Regulation
B for the ECOA,' 8 and Regulation X for RESPA. 9 Some of these regula-
tions, such as Regulations Z and B, even have official staff commentaries
on the regulation. With all of the various statutes and levels of regulations,
it is not surprising that banks are confused and often inadvertently violate
the rules.
The federal government has not been alone in its regulation of consumer
credit transactions. Several states have adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code (UCCC), which contains many of the same disclosure requirements as
the TILA and regulates various other aspects of consumer credit transactions.
Many other states have provisions requiring that lenders make certain disclosures.
Additionally, almost every state has some sort of usury law that establishes
maximum permissible interest rates for various types of lending transactions.20
The purpose of this comment is to provide a guide for banks and their
attorneys as they attempt to navigate this jungle of consumer credit legisla-
tion and engage in the increasingly hazardous business of consumer lending.
The comment outlines the major federal consumer credit statutes and attempts
to point out potential liability areas. Several important state statutes that also
impact on consumer lending are discussed. The comment concludes by sug-
gesting that banks increasingly need to have counsel involved in their loan
committees and policy-making decisions to help avoid substantial liability under
the various consumer protection statutes.
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) Coverage
Coverage
Regulation Z was issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to implement the TILA and the FCBA.2' The regulation applies to
individuals or businesses extending credit who can meet four conditions. First,
the credit must be offered or extended to consumers. 2 "Consumer" is defined
to generally mean "a cardholder or a natural person to whom consumer credit
is offered or extended. ' 2 3 Thus, an offering or extension of credit to a cor-
poration or other business entity would not be included within the definition
of consumer.
16. For example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is given this authority
under 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982) of the Truth in Lending Act.
17. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1987).
18. Id. § 202.
19. 24 C.F.R. § 3500 (1987). Besides these regulations, there are regulations for Fair Credit
Practices at 12 C.F.R. § 227 (1987).
20. See, e.g., OI. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 2 (Oklahoma's constitution imposes the basic usury
provision and then allows the legislature to set different rates).
21. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (1987).
22. Id. § 226.1(c).
23. Id. § 226.2(a)(11).
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The second precondition to the application of Regulation Z is that the of-
fering or extension of credit must be done regularly.2 ' "Regularly" is defined
as extending credit more than twenty-five times (or more than five times for
transactions secured by a dwelling) in the previous year. 5 Hence, a normal
bank will always meet this requirement.
The third precondition to applicability of Regulation Z, with an exception
for travel and entertainment card issuers and other limited exceptions, is that
the credit must be subject to a finance charge or be payable by a written
agreement in more than four installments. 6 Obviously, a bank will meet this
requirement in the course of its normal lending activities. One potential risk
that this section does impose, however, is that a bank selling repossessed col-
lateral may, as an inducement, "regularly" allow buyers to pay in more than
four installments. This could trigger the requirement of disclosure. If proper
disclosure was not given, the bank would be in violation of Regulation Z
in a transaction that it probably did not contemplate was a credit transaction,
much less a Regulation Z transaction.
The final precondition to the applicability of Regulation Z is that the credit
must be "primarily for personal, family, or household purpose." '2 7 This re-
quirement is the most important from the bank's standpoint because it is the
factor that generally determines whether the TILA and Regulation Z are ap-
plicable to a particular credit transaction. As mentioned previously, the sec-
ond and third requirements will always be met in the normal situation; and
the first requirement by definition depends on the existence of this final re-
quirement.2" Therefore, the applicability of Regulation Z to a particular bank
credit transaction will usually depend on whether the loan is primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes.
The courts and the Federal Reserve staff have struggled with the exact mean-
ing of this requirement and the appropriate test to employ to determine whether
it has been inez. The Federal Reserve recognizes that there is no precise test
for what constitutes credit offered or extended primarily for family, personal,
or household purposes.2 9 However, the Official Staff Commentary on Regula-
tion Z indicates that the following factors should be considered in determin-
ing whether the credit is primarily for business purposes.
1. The relationship of the borrower's primary occupation to the
acquisition. The more closely related, the more likely it is to
be business purpose.
24. Id. § 226.1(c).
25. Id. § 226.2 n.3.
26. Id. § 226.1(c).
27. Id.
28. "Consumer" is defined as a person to whom "consumer credit" is offered or extended.
Id. § 226.2(a)(11). "Consumer credit" is then defined as "credit offered or extended to a con-
sumer primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." Id. § 226.2(a)(12).
29. BOARD op GovEmUORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERvE SYsTEm, OFFCIAL STAFF COMMENTARY
ON REGULATION Z: TRuTu IN LENDING § 226.2(a)(12) (1981) [hereinafter OFFICIAL STAFF Com-




2. The degree to which the borrower will personally manage the
acquisition. The more personal involvement there is, the more
likely it is to be business purpose.
3. The ratio of income from the acquisition to the total income
of the borrower. The higher the ratio, the more likely it is to
be business purpose.
4. The size of the transaction. The larger the transaction, the more
likely it is to be business purpose.
5. The borrower's statement of purpose for the loan.30
Obviously, these guidelines are not very useful in the borderline cases. One
such case is Tower v. Moss." In Tower the plaintiff/debtor was living in an
apartment at the time she approached the defendant for a loan. The proceeds
of the loan were for repairs and improvements on a home in which the defen-
dant had resided for a number of years and in which she intended to reside
upon her retirement. The home was currently being leased to a tenant who
was staying in the home largely in a custodial role and paying nominal rent.
The court held the purpose of the credit transaction was primarily for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes and disclosure was thus required.
32
Dougherty v. Hoolihan, Neils, & Boland, Ltd. is another interesting case.33
In this case plaintiff gave an attorney a note secured by a mortgage on the
plaintiff's farm as consideration for services provided by the attorney in deter-
mining whether a bank had misapplied funds in connection with the foreclosure
sale of personal property from the plaintiff's farm. The court held the trans-
action was primarily for personal, family, or household use and the TILA
applied because the legal services were rendered with respect to personal prop-
erty of the plaintiff."'
These cases clearly demonstrate the difficulty that can be encountered in
determining whether a particular transaction is a consumer credit transaction.
Another problem that can arise is that a personal loan to a business customer,
which may be made by the commercial loan department of the bank, can
be classified as a consumer loan for purposes of Regulation Z. In light of
the difficulty of classifying loans as consumer or business and the potential
30. Id. § 226.3(a)(2). Additionally, if the property is nonowner-occupied rental property (i.e.,
owner expects to occupy for fourteen days or less during the coming year), the credit is deemed
to be for a business purpose. If the property is owner-occupied rental property (i.e., owner ex-
pects to occupy for more than fourteen days during the coming year), the credit is deemed to
be for business purposes if: (1) credit is extended to acquire the rental property and it contains
more than two housing units; or (2) credit is extended to maintain or improve the rental property
and the property contains more than four housing units. Id. § 226.3(a)(3), (4).
31. 625 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980).
32. Id. at 1166-67. This holding should be compared to the Official Federal Reserve Staff
Commentary, which states: "Credit extended to acquire, improve, or maintain rental property
that is not owner-occupied is deemed to be for business purposes." OFFIcIA STAFF COMNMNTARY
oN R GULATION Z, supra note 29, § 226.3(a)(3).
33. 531 F. Supp. 717 (D. Minn. 1982).
34. Id. at 721.
1987]
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liability of noncompliance, 35 a bank would be wise to get legal counsel prior
to offering or extending credit, instead of after something goes wrong, as
is usually the case. With the aid of informed counsel, the bank can dramatically
increase its chances of making a correct decision on the classification of in-
dividual credit transactions.
Once the credit transaction has been classified, it must be examined to deter-
mine whether it falls within one of Regulation Z's exempt transactions. The
regulation sp.cifically exludes (1) business, commercial, agricultural, and
organizational credit; (2) credit above $25,000 not secured by real property
or a dwelling; (3) public utility credit; (4) securities or commodities accounts;
and (5) student loan programs.3 6 The Official Staff Commentary indicates
that a loan commitment for credit in excess of $25,000 will be exempt even
if the amounts actually drawn never reach $25,000.31 However, where an
original loan for more than $25,000 is rewritten for less than $25,000 or a
security interest in real property is added to an extension of credit for more
than $25,000, the transaction is consumer credit requiring disclosure if the
existing obligation is satisfied and replaced by a new obligation made for con-
sumer purposes. 38 Thus, bankers cannot be certain that a loan originally ex-
empted from Regulation Z will remain so upon refinancing.
Also, a .oan that appears to be clearly for consumer purposes may be
characterized as being for business purposes because of what the borrower
states he intends to do with the proceeds. Hence, the court in Conrad v. Smith
held that there was no question of fact as to whether the loan was for con-
sumer purposes where the borrower pledged his house as collateral and declared
in his application that the loan was for business purposes.39 Once again, the
need for caution is apparent.
Disclosure Requirements
Once the bank determines that a particular transaction does fall within the
scope of Regulation Z, it must make certain disclosures. For purposes of
making disclosures, Regulation Z divides credit into two types-open-end and
closed-end. "Open-end credit" is defined as consumer credit extended under
a plan in which: (1) the creditor contemplates repeated transactions; (2) the
creditor may impose periodic finance charges on the unpaid balance; and (3)
the amount of credit that may be extended during the term is generally made
available to the extent that any outstanding balance is repaid. 40 "Closed-end
credit," on the other hand, is simply defined as "credit other than 'open-end
credit'." 4 ' Regulation Z imposes different disclosure requirements for each
type of credit.
35. See infra discussion in text accompanying note 86.
36. 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 (1987).
37. OFFICLU. STAFF COMMENTARY ON REGULATION Z, supra note 29, § 226.3(b)(1).
38. Id. § 226.3(b)(3).
39. 42 Wash. App. 559, 712 P.2d 866, 867-68 (Ct. App. 1986).
40. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (1987).




Regardless of the type of credit, Regulation Z requires disclosure of the
finance charge.42 "Finance charge" is defined as the cost of consumer credit
stated as a dollar amount and includes "any charge payable directly or in-
directly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor
as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit."'4 3 Although Regula-
tion Z lists various charges that are or are not included in the finance charge,
4 4
difficulty can still arise in determining exactly what should be included in
the finance charge for a particular loan.
For example, in Laubach v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., the court
held that the lender violated the TILA and Regulation Z by failing to include
in the finance charge accrued real estate taxes that the lender required the
buyer to pay."1 In Steele v. Ford Motor Credit, the court held that Ford Motor
Credit violated the TILA when it refinanced the debtor's prior debt and failed
to include sixteen days of unearned interest on the prior loan in the finance
charge for the subsequent loan.16 These cases, the results of which may be
questionable, nonetheless clearly illustrate some of the risks an unwary banker
faces in making routine consumer loans and determining what exactly to in-
clude in calculating the finance charge.
Once the banker determines what the finance charge is, he must determine
what else he needs to disclose and how he needs to do it. With open-end
42. Id. §§ 226.6(a), 226.18(d). For open-end credit, section 226.6(a) requires disclosure of
the circumstances under which a finance charge will be imposed and an explanation of how
it will be determined. For closed-end credit, section 226.18(d) requires disclosure of the amount
of the finance charge.
43. Id. § 226.4(a).
44. The following are some common charges that Regulation Z includes in the finance charge:
(1) interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under an add-on or discount
system of additional charges;
(2) service, transaction, and carrying charges;
(3) points, loan fees, assumption fees, etc.;
(4) appraisal, investigation, and credit report fees;
(5) premiums or fees on insurance protecting against consumer's default;
(6) premiums for credit life, accident, health, or loss of income insurance written in connec-
tion with a credit transaction (if such insurance is required by creditor); and
(7) premiums for property insurance written in connection with the credit transaction in which
consumer is not allowed to obtain the insurance from a person of the consumer's choice.
The following are some common charges that Regulation Z excludes from the finance charge:
(1) application fees;
(2) charges for late payment, exceeding credit limit, or default;
(3) fees charged for participation in credit plan;
(4) seller's points; and
(5) bona fide and reasonable fees for title examination, abstract of title, title insurance, prop-
erty survey, deed preparation, mortgage preparation, settlement, notary, appraisal, and credit
reports, if the transaction is secured by real property or by the consumer's dwelling and if the
proceeds were used to acquire or construct such dwelling. Id. § 226.4(b), (c).
45. No. 85-1902 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 1986).
46. 783 F.2d 1016 (11th Cir. 1986). Payments on the first loan were due on the 26th of
each month. The lender received four payments on the initial loan, but the debtor refinanced
after three months and 14 days. Under state law, the lender was entitled to the full four months'
interest. Id. at 1017-18.
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credit (i.e., revolving loans, lines of credit, and credit cards) the creditor initially
must disclose the following:
1) The method of determining the finance charge, and when it
begins to accrue;
2) Each periodic rate that may be used to calculate the finance
charge, and the range of balances to which these rates apply;
3) The corresponding annual percentage rate [APR];'"
4) The method used to determine the balance on which the finance
charge will be computed;
5) Other charges;
6) Security interests; and
7) Billing rights.'
8
If the loan is subject to a variable rate of interest, the creditor must also
disclose the circumstances under which the rate may increase, any limitations
on the increase, and the effects of an increase.' 9
The disclosure statement must be provided before the first transaction is
made under the plan. 0 These disclosures must be made "clearly and con-
spicuously in writing," and the terms "finance charge" and "annual percent-
age rate" must be more conspicuous than any other disclosure."'
Although model disclosure forms are appended to Regulation Z, creditors
sometimes run into trouble with the conspicuity requirement. For example,
in Herrera v. First National Savings & Loan Association, the court held that
the creditor's disclosure statement violated Regulation Z because the term "an-
nual percentage rate" was in boldface capital letters along with more than
thirty other terms and phrases in the disclosure statement.3 2 Thus, bankers
should carefu~ly examine their disclosure forms to ensure that they meet Regula-
tion Z's conspicuity requirement as well as provide all of the required
disclosures.
In addition. to initial disclosures, the open-end credit lender must furnish
the consumer with periodic statements." These statements must list the previous
balance, if any; the credit transactions during the period; the credits to the
account; the periodic rates; balances to which they apply and the correspond-
ing APR; the amount of the balance on which the finance charge is com-
puted and how it was determined; the amount of the finance charge; the an-
nual percentage rate; other charges; the closing date of the billing cycle; the
47. The "corresponding annual percentage rate" is "a measure of the cost of credit, expressed
as a yearly rate" and is computed by multiplying each periodic rate by the number of periods
in a year. 12 C.F.R. § 226.14 (1987).
48. Id. § 226.6.
49. Id. § 226.6 n.12.
50. Id. § 226.5(b).
51. Id. § 226.5.
52. 805 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Dixey v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 677 F.2d 749
(9th Cir. 1982) (TILA violated where terms "finance charge" and "annual percentage rate"
were in bold-face type but no bolder than several other headings and disclosures on the same page),




new balance; any time period in which any portion of the balance can be
paid to avoid additional finance charges; and the address to be used for notice
of billing errors.54 Also, the creditor must provide periodic statements of bill-
ing rights and notice of certain changes in the terms of the account.5
On the other hand, when the credit is closed-end, the creditor must disclose
the following:
1) The identity of the creditor;
2) The amount financed;-
6
3) An itemization of the amount financed, unless the creditor pro-
vides a statement to the consumer that he has the right to
receive a written itemization with a space for the consumer
to indicate whether it is desired, and the consumer does not
request the statement;
4) The finance charge;
5) The annual percentage rate;
6) The number, amount, and timing of scheduled payments;
7) The total of all payments to be made;
8) Whether the obligation has a demand feature;
9) The consumer's prepayment rights or right to refund;
10) The amount of any late charges;
11) Any security interests taken;
12) The assumption policy on a residential mortgage transaction;
5 7
13) And certain other specified items."
If the loan is variable rate, the same disclosures must be given as with an
open-end variable rate account, but the creditor must also provide an example
of the payment terms that would result from an increase in the rate. 9
As with open-end credit, the closed-end credit disclosures are subject to
requirements of conspicuity.6" Additionally, the disclosures must be grouped
together and segregated from everything else. 61 Also, the terms "finance
charge" and "annual percentage rate" must be more conspicuous than any
other disclosure except the creditor's identity.62 Finally, the required disclosures
must be made before "consummation" of the transaction.6 3
54. Id.
55. Id. § 226.9.
56. The amount financed is calculated by determining the principal loan amount, adding
any other amounts that are financed by the creditor, which are not a part of the finance charge,
and subtracting any prepaid finance charge. Id. § 226.18(b).
57. A "residential mortgage transaction" is defined as a transaction where a consensual security
interest is created or retained in the consumer's principal dwelling to finance the acquisition
or initial construction of that dwelling. Id. § 226.2(a)(24).
58. Id. § 226.18.
59. Id. § 226.18(f.
60. Id. § 226.17.
61. Id. § 226.17(a)(1).
62. Id. § 116.17(a)(2).
63. Id. § 226.17(b). "Consummation" is defined as the time that a consumer becomes con-
tractually obligated on a credit transaction. Id. § 226.2(a)(13). The Staff Commentary to Regula-
19871
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Not only is disclosure required before consummation, it is also required
upon refinancing or an assumption." Regulation Z defines a refinancing as
occurring when an existing obligation subject to the TILA is satisfied and
replaced by a new obligation undertaken by the same consumer." Thus, a
simple refinancing or assumption can also trigger Regulation Z's disclosure,
requirements.
The result of these complex disclosure requirements is that it is extremely
easy for banks and other creditors to innocently violate Regulation Z. For
instance, in. Whitley v. Southern Discount Co., the court held that the
disclosure of the late payment charge was ambiguous and violated the TILA
because it failed to indicate how partial payments would be handled." Even
if this case is incorrect, it shows how complex the issues are.
Another fertile ground for litigation is the disclosure of security interests.
In Kadlec Motors v. Knudson, the underlying sales contract did not state the
purpose of the security interest. The court held that the creditor's failure to
disclose a consensual security interest violated the TILA.
67
Besides governing consumer credit in general, Regulation Z also has provi-
sions dealing specifically with limited liability on credit cards and credit adver-
tising. The credit card provision stipulates that credit cards may only be issued
upon request by the consumer, or as renewals of previously issued cards. The
liability of cardholders for unauthorized use is limited to a maximum of $50.68
Regulation Z also prohibits offset of the cardholder's debt against any funds
that are on deposit with the card issuer. 69 Additionally, Regulation Z's adver-
tising provisions require that certain disclosures be made in consumer credit
advertising.70
The Right of Rescission
Regulation Z also provides for a right of rescission under both open-end
and closed-end credit transactions. The right of rescission is essentially the
same under both types of credit. Whenever a security interest is acquired in
tion Z states that the existence of a contractual obligation on the consumer's part is a matter
to be determined under applicable state law. OF'icAL STAFF CommiNTARY ON RECULAT ON Z,
supra note 29, § 226.3(a)(13)(1).
64. 12 C.F.R. § 226.20(a), (b) (1987).
65. Id.
66. 772 F.2d 815 (11th Cir. 1985), See also Watts v. Key Dodge Sales, Inc., 707 F.2d 847,
852 (5th Cir. 1983) (a reasonable debtor could not determine whether the creditor was entitled
to impose a d.linquency charge of 501% of the full amount of the installment, or merely 5%
of the unpaid balance).
67. 383 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(a), (b) (1987).
69. Id. § 226.12(d). Section 226.12 also has certain other provisions affecting credit cards,
but a discussion of those provisions is beyond the scope of this comment.
70. Id. §§ 226.16, 226.24. For example, in closed-end credit, if the advertisement contains
the amount or percentage of the down payment, the number of payments or period of repay-
ment, the amcunt of any payment, or the amount of any finance charge, the following must
be disclosed: (I) the amount or percentage of the down payment; (2) the terms of repayment;




the consumer's principal dwelling as part of the transaction, Regulation Z
provides that each consumer whose ownership interest is or will be subject
to the security interest has the right to rescind the transaction.71 This right
normally expires at midnight of the third business day following consumma-
tion of the transaction." The creditor is required to provide the consumer
with notice of this right. 3 Failure to give the notice or make material
disclosures 74 extends the right to a maximum of three years.75
When a consumer exercises his right to rescind, the effect is that the secur-
ity interest is canceled and the consumer is not liable for any amount, in-
cluding any finance charge. 76 Also, the creditor is required to return any money
that the consumer has paid, and the consumer is required to tender back any
money or property that the creditor has delivered.77 Thus, the effect of rescis-
sion is as if the transaction had never occurred, and the parties are returned
to their original positions.
However, certain transactions are exempted from the right of rescission.
The main such exemption applies to the residential mortgage transaction.78
Regulation Z defines this special statutory term as a transaction in which a
consensual security interest is created or retained in the consumer's principal
dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of that dwelling.
7"
Therefore, the right of rescission will not apply to a purchase money mort-
gage or a construction loan on a consumer's principal dwelling. Another trans-
action that is exempted (for closed-end credit only) is a refinancing or con-
71. Id. §§ 226.15(a), 226.23(a).
72. Id. Under section 226.15(a), the open-end credit consumer has the right to rescind (1)
each credit extension made under the plan, unless the extension is within an established credit
limit; (2) the plan when it is opened; (3) a security interest when added or increased to secure
an existing plan; and (4) the increase when the credit limit on the plan is increased.
73. Id. §§ 226.15(b), 226.23(b).
74. A "material disclosure" is defined by TILA as a required disclosure of the annual percentage
rate; the method of determining the finance charge and the balance upon which finance charge
will be imposed; the amount of the finance charge; the amount to be financed; the total of
the payments; the number and amount of the payments; and the due dates of the payments.
15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (1982). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(a)(3) n.36 (1987).
It should also be noted that liens that arise by operation of law (i.e., mechanic's and
materialmen's liens) are not considered security interests for disclosure purposes under the general
requirements of open-end and closed-end credit transactions, but they are considered as such
in transactions where the right to rescind exists. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(25) (1987).
75. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(a)(3) (1987). Actually the right to rescind expires upon the earlier
of three years after consummation, or upon transfer of the consumer's interest in the property
or sale of the property. Id.
76. Id. §§ 226.15(d)(1), 226.23(d)(1).
77. Id. §§ 226.15(d), 226.23(d). The creditor is given twenty days to return any money or
property received and to take any action necessary to reflect the termination of the security in-
terest. The creditor's performance then triggers the consumer's obligation to tender back any
money or property he has received. The court, however, is given the power to modify these
procedures. Id.
78. Id. §§ 226.15(0(1), 226.23(f)(1).
79. Id. § 226.2(a)(24).
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solidation by the same creditor of an extension of credit already secured by
the consumer's principal dwelling, if no new money is advanced.80
One of the most prolific areas of litigation under Regulation Z and the
TILA is the right of rescission. This can probably be attributed to the fact
that a violation of the right of rescission provisions not only allows damages
to be collected but also allows the consumer to get out of the loan obligation.
In today's economy, a debtor who cannot pay his obligations is quick to look
for a way to legally get out of having to pay. The right of rescission is one
easy way.
One case that dramatically indicates the risk banks face from failing to
adequately give notice of the right to rescind is Semar v. Platte Valley Federal
Savings & Loan Association." In Semar the court allowed the consumers to
rescind the mortgage on their home 2 years after consummation of the loan.
The court found the notice of the right to rescind to be inadequate because
the lender's notice stated that the right would expire three business days from
July 16, instead of expressly stating that such right would expire on July 21."
Another problem is presented by a third party having an ownership interest
in the property the consumer has encumbered. The Federal Reserve staff and
most commentators agree that the third party also has to be given notice of
the right to rescind and can independently exercise the right. 8" However, the
situation becomes even more complicated when the consumer has someone
else, such as a son, give a security interest in the son's dwelling as collateral
for a loan to the consumer. In State Bank of Wiley v. State, the court was
confronted with this situation and held that the consumer had no right to
rescind."' Seemingly, though, under the official Staff Commentary to Regula-
tion Z, the creditor would still have to give the party who pledged his prin-
cipal dwelling as security (i.e., the son) a three-day right to rescind. 8 These
situations certainly represent examples of some of the traps that exist in the
TILA and Regulation Z for the unwary banker, and the cost of falling into
these traps can be great.
Liability
The most important question in the banker's mind is probably: What will
happen to me if I violate Truth in Lending or Regulation Z? The right of
rescission represents one such adverse consequence. However, the TILA also
provides for other civil penalties that can be substantial when considered in
their entirety. The TILA provides that a creditor who violates any provision
of the statute is liable to the consumer for any actual damages sustained.
80. Id. § 226.2 (f)(2).
81. 791 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 703-05.
83. See Omctu. STAF ComMENTARY ON REGULATION Z, supra note 29, 226.23(a)(1)(2); Griffith,
supra note 6, at 35.
84. 723 P.2d 159, 160-61 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).




For the violation of many provisions, the consumer may also recover statutory
damages in an amount equal to twice the finance charge, but not less than
$100 or greater than $1,000; and a prevailing consumer may recover his costs
together with a reasonable attorney's fee.
86
Lenders have argued in the past that a threshold question to liability should
be whether the disclosure and credit terms actually misled or confused the
consumer.8 7 However, the courts have rejected this argument and, instead,
employ an objective standard to determine TILA violations and hold that
the credit agreement, rather than the consumer's understanding of the terms,
forms the basis for TILA violations. 8'
Another issue under the Act is the liability of assignees for TILA and Regula-
tion Z violations by their assignors. The TILA provides that an assignee is
liable only if the violation "is apparent on the face of the disclosure state-
ment."8 9 However, any consumer who has the right to rescind may exercise
his right to rescind against an assignee. 9" Also, an assignee may escape liabil-
ity under the TILA because a particular violation is not apparent on the face
of the document, but, according to at least one questionable case, may be
held liable under other law for the same violation if a "claims and defenses"
clause is present in the underlying installment sales contract.91 Thus, assignees
also face potential liability under the TILA.
On the surface, the penalties that the TILA imposes may not appear to be much
to the banker. However, closer examination reveals that the total result can
be substantial liability for a TILA violation. As one commentator stated:
The actual money recovery awarded under the Act [TILA] to
a successful consumer litigant tends to be modest. The recovery
of actual damages is virtually unheard of in Truth in Lending ac-
tions ....
In contrast to these amounts are the substantial sums which the
consumer's attorney may be awarded as a reasonable fee....
Creditors do not appear to analyze sufficiently this potential ex-
posure, particularly in their initial evaluation of their cases, and
all too often are surprised to learn, usually during the fee hearing
or even later, the source of their most significant liability.
92
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1982).
87. See Collins, Consumer Credit, in 1983 ANN. SuRvEY AM. L. 497, 504 (1984).
88. See, e.g., Zamarippa v. Cy's Car Sales, Inc., 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982) (court
rejected argument that consumer not injured because could not read or understand English).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (1982). Section 1641(a) provides that a violation apparent on the
face of the disclosure that can be determined to be incomplete or inaccurate from the face of
the disclosure statement or other documents assigned and a disclosure that does not use the
required terms.
90. Id. § 1641(c).
91. Cox v. First Nat'l Bank, 633 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (assignee held liable under
"claims and defenses" clause for failure of disclosure statement to show $400 downpayment).
92. Rubin, The Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 99 BANnrnoL.J. 512, 513-14 (1982).
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Hence, the possibility of the award of substantial attorney fees makes poten-
tial liability under the Act significant. Substantial liability can also result from
the imposition of actual and statutory damages in a class action where actual
damages are unlimited and statutory damages of up to the lesser of $500,000
or 1 percent of the lender's net worth can be awarded.9 3
Some of the recent TILA litigation has focused on the issue of attorney
fees. In Jarmes v. Home Construction Co. of Mobile, the Eleventh Circuit
allowed art attorney whose fee was omitted from the settlement of a TILA
claim to bring a direct action for his fee.94 The court believed this right was
implied in t.he statutory framework. However, in Freeman v. B & B Associates,
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the waiver of attorney fees in a
settlement agreement between a borrower and a lender who had violated the
TILA barred the borrower's attorneys from an independent action to recover
attorney fees.95 Thus, there is some uncertainty as to the extent of an at-
torney's right to maintain an independent action for attorney fees.
There has also been some dispute over whether an attorney's fee should
be awarded to the consumer for defending a creditor's counterclaim for pay-
ment of the debt.96 In Lacy v. General Finance Corp., the court denied the
consumer's request for attorney fees for defending against the creditor's
counterclaim because it believed this was not enforcing liability under the Act.97
In a somewhat related case, however, the court held that the failure of the
consumer to prevail on every claim for fraud and securities violations did
not require a reduction in the award for attorney fees under the TILA.9' Seem-
ingly, this case is contrary to the rationale in Lacy because part of the award
of attorney fees included time spent on the non-TILA claims. Therefore, this
area must also be considered as being somewhat unsettled.
Finally, even if the creditor does prevail on his claim on the underlying
obligation, he is not entitled to offset the consumer's attorney fees against
this amount.9 9 As one court stated, "the attorney is entitled to the fee that
is awarded him regardless of any controversy regarding the underlying debt." 00
Defenses
Fortunately for the banker, the TILA provides for several defenses to liabil-
ity. First, there is no liability for failing to comply with the TILA if within sixty
days of discovering a violation, and prior to the institution of an action by
the consumer, the creditor notifies the consumer of the error and makes any
adjustments necessary to assure that the debtor will not be required to pay
93. 15 U.S.C § 1640(2)(b) (1982). See also Preston v. First Bank of Marietta, 16 Ohio App.
3d 4, 473 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (1983) (court held mortgage clause violating TILA unenforceable).
94. 689 F.2d 1357, 1359 (lth Cir. 1982).
95. 790 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
96. See Griffith, supra note 6, at 50-51.
97. 651 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1981).
98. City Con:;umer Serv., Inc. v. Home, 631 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Utah 1986).
99. See, e.g., Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv., Inc., 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979).




an amount in excess of the lower of the charge actually disclosed or the dollar
equivalent of the annual percentage rate actually disclosed.1"' In essence, these
required adjustments severely limit the scope and applicability of this defense.
Second, the creditor will not be held liable if the violation was not intentional
and resulted from a bona fide error, notwithstanding the maintenance of pro-
cedures to avoid any such error. 0 2 Third, the creditor will not be held liable
for any act done in good faith and in conformity with any Federal Reserve
Board rule or interpretation. 3 Finally, except with regard to the separate
three-year limitation period on the right to rescind, the consumer must bring
an action for violation within one year from the date of the occurrence of
the violation.'04
The bona fide error defense may appear at first glance to be a large excep-
tion to liability under the TILA. However, the statute lists clerical, calcula-
tion, computer malfunction and programming, and printing errors as examples
of bona fide errors; an error of legal judgment with respect to the lender's
obligation under the TILA is specifically excepted from this defense.' °O This
seems to indicate that Congress intended that the bona fide error defense apply
in very few situations. Also, some substantial burdens for establishing this
defense have been imposed by the courts.' 06
Similarly, the one-year statute of limitations is not the safe harbor that
it appears. The TILA specifically provides that the one-year limitation period
may not apply to bar an assertion of a TILA violation as a set-off or recoup-
ment defense in an action to collect the debt. 07 Also, equitable tolling doc-
trines have been applied by some courts. Thus, in King v. California, the
court held that even though the one-year statute of limitations starts to run
when disclosure is due, it could be tolled until the consumer learns of
the improper disclosure where the consumer did not know of the violation
at the time of the credit transaction and could not possibly know of it.'08
Additionally, repeated violations may each give rise to a new cause of action
and, thus, a new one-year statute of limitations." 9 Again, the banker must
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (1982).
102. Id. § 1640)c).
103. Id. § 1640(0.
104. Id. § 1640(e).
105. Id. § 1640(c). See also Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 879
(7th Cir. 1976) (bona fide error defense limited to errors of a clerical nature), overruled on other
grounds, Brown v. Marquette, 686 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1982).
106. Mirabal, 537 F.2d at 876-79 (creditor must establish both the existence of procedures
designed to avoid bona fide errors and the continued maintenance of such procedures).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1982). But set-off of a time-barred claim may be proper.
108. 784 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1986).
109. Schmidt v. Citibank South Dakota, 645 F. Supp. 214 (D. Conn. 1986) (where credit card
user sends multiple billing statements, each of which have an error in the required disclosure,
each statement is a new breach of the law that gives the consumer a new and different cause
of action for purposes of determining when the one-year statute of limitations runs).
However, a debtor cannot sue on each of these repeated violations and recover damages for
each. Section 1640(g) provides that multiple failures to disclose entitle the debtor to only a single
recovery. Thus, the multiple violations would not give rise to multiple recoveries. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(g) (1982).
19871
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
take every available precaution because one cannot be sure as to how these
issues will f'jally be resolved.
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
Requirements
After the TILA, probably the next most important legislation affecting con-
sumer credit is the ECOA." ° The ECOA is even broader than the TILA; it
applies to all types of lending. However, consumer lending seems to be the
area where an ECOA violation is most likely to occur because Regulation
B provides business creditors with specialized status and exempts them from
many of Regulation B's provisions."' It is apparent that many banks, savings
and loans, and credit unions fail to comply with the ECOA's requirements. "
The ECOA prohibits discrimination by a creditor against an applicant with
respect to any aspect of the credit transaction on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, an applicant's derivation
of all or part of income from a public assistance program, or an applicant's
exercise of a right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. ' 3 A creditor
is allowed to inquire into marital status if the inquiry is for the purpose of
ascertaining the creditor's rights and remedies applicable to a particular ex-
tension of credit. However, the creditor may not take this information into
account in evaluating the creditworthiness of the applicant and thereby use
it as a basis for discrimination.I" Also, a creditor may inquire into the appli-
cant's age or whether the applicant's income derives from a public assistance
program if such inquiry is only for the purpose of determining the amount
and probable continuance of income levels, credit history, or other pertinent
elements of creditworthiness; again, the creditor may not use this informa-
tion to discriminate against the applicant.' IS Additionally, a creditor is allowed
to inquire as to the age of an applicant and use it as a factor in considering
the application if the information is used in favor of the applicant; however,
the creditor cannot use the applicant's age as a basis for discriminating against
the applicant.'
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1987) (Regulation B).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 & 1691a(b), (f) (1982) make the Act in general applicable to business
credit. However, Regulation B exempts business credit from many of the Regulation B requirements.
12 C.F.R. § 202.3(a), (e) (1987).
112. Miller, Recent Developments-Equal Credit Opportunity, in CONStmR CRDrr GoNo
iNTo THE 80's, 245, 249 (1981). Professor Miller reports that the 1980 annual report to Congress
by the Federal Re;erve Board on equal credit opportunity discloses that 25 percent to more than
50 percent of all examined banks, savings and loans, and credit unions were not in compliance
with the ECOA. See also Matheson, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act. A Functional Failure,
21 HARv. J. oi€ Lsors. 371, 377-78 (1984) (Federal Reserve Board discovered more than 17,000
violations of the Act during routine bank examinations over one eighteen-month period).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1982).
114. Id. § 1691(b)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b) (1987).
115. 15 U.S.C § 1691(b)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b).




The ECOA also imposes some procedural requirements. The Act states that
each applicant against whom adverse action is taken is entitled to a statement
of reasons for such action from the creditor."I7 The creditor must then, within
thirty days of receipt of a completed application, either provide a written state-
ment of the specific reasons for the adverse action taken or give the applicant
written notice of his right to a statement of reasons." 8 "Adverse action" is
defined as a denial or revocation of credit; a change in terms of an existing
credit arrangement, not agreed to by the applicant, that does not affect a
substantial portion of a classification of a creditor's accounts; or a refusal
to grant credit in the amount or on substantially the terms requested unless
the offered terms are actually accepted."'
Regulation B imposes many additional or more specific requirements on
the creditor. Section 202.5 prohibits the creditor from making oral or written
statements in advertisements or otherwise that would discourage, on a pro-
hibited basis, a reasonable person from making or pursuing an application.' 2'
Also, a creditor cannot prohibit a married applicant from opening or main-
taining an account in her maiden name; and a creditor is prohibited from
requiring the signature of an applicant's spouse if the applicant would qualify
individually for the credit under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness.' 2'
However, if the applicant is relying in part on property to establish credit-
worthiness or is pledging property as collateral, the creditor may require the
signature of the applicant's spouse or any other person reasonably believed
to be necessary under state law to make the property relied upon available
to satisfy the debt in case of default.'22 Also, a creditor may request a cosigner
or guarantor if, under the lender's credit standards, the personal liability of
another person is necessary; but the lender may not require that the spouse
be the additional party.123
Except for cases where intent to discriminate is obvious or a specific rule
in Regulation B is violated, a consumer has two ways to show a violation
of the law: disparate treatment and disparate impact."' One commentator
described disparate treatment that violates the general rule against discrimina-
tion of Regulation B, section 202.4 as follows:
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2).
118. Id. § 1691(d).
119. Id. § 1691(d)(6); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c). Congress thoughtfully decided to exempt a creditor's
refusal to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement where the applicant is
delinquent or in default from the definition of an "adverse action." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6).
120. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a).
121. Id. § 202.7(b), (d)(1).
122. Id. § 202.7(d)(2), (4).
123. Id. § 202.7(d)(5).
124. Matheson, supra note 112, at 382-85. See also Miller v. American Express Co., 688 F.2d
1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1982) (specific intent to discriminate not required; credit discrimination
can be proved by tests delineated under Title VII); Sayer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
522 F. Supp. 835, 839-40 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Cragin v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 498 F.
Supp. 379, 384 (D. Nev. 1980); K. REmDN & J. McCLtAN., FEDERAL REGULATION OF CON-
StmUMR CREDITOR RELATIONS § 7.6(D) (1982).
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Disparate treatment occurs when some people are treated less
favorably than others because of an identifiable characteristic such
as race, sex or national origin. Discriminatory intent is proved by
evidence that the creditor's stated reason for refusing credit to the
plaintiff was not applied by the creditor to others situated similar-
ly to the plaintiff. In essence, proof of disparate treatment is an
attempt to show discriminatory intent by means of circumstantial
evidence.2 '
Disparate impact, on the other hand, allows the consumer to prove discrimina-
tion by showing that the apparently neutral application of the lender's credit
criteria results in the systematic exclusion of one of the classes protected by
the Act, resulting in a disparate impact on that group. In addition, the con-
sumer must show that there is not sufficient justification for this result .
26
With disparate impact consumers need not show that the creditor intentional-
ly discriminated against them.' 2 Once a consumer shows disparate impact,
the burden shifts to the creditor to show that the practice relates to creditworth-
iness; if that is established, the issue then becomes whether another, less
discriminatoir practice would serve as well.'
21
The courts have generally construed the ECOA strictly and have been quick
to find violations. For example, in Miller v. American Express Co., the court
held that American Express' policy of automatically cancelling a supplemen-
tary cardholder's account upon the death of the basic cardholder violated
the ECOA because it did not provide for a separate inquiry into the credit-
worthiness of the supplementary cardholder.' 29 Miller involved a suit by a
widow who had a separate card number with a separate fee imposed and had
signed a separate agreement providing that she would be liable for all charges
on the account. The court's holding in this case is probably justifiable because
the facts suggest that for all practical purposes the widow had an account
separate from her husband. In a stranger case, Markham v. Colonial Mort-
gage Service Co., the court held that the lender discriminated on the basis
of marital status where it refused to aggregate the incomes of an unmarried
couple as it would a married couple when both would be liable on the debt. 30
Additionally, courts often apply the ECOA in situations the ordinary banker
would not expect. For instance, in Owens & Maddock v. Macgee Finance
125. Matheson, supra note 112, at 383. The author stated as an illustration that a rejected
applicant might prove disparate treatment by showing (1) membership in a protected class; (2)
that the applicant applied for credit and was financially able and willing to repay; (3) that the
applicant was nevertheless refused credit; and (4) that the creditor continues to seek to extend
credit to other applicants with similar willingness and ability to repay. Id.
126. Id. at 384.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 385. This test originated in employment discrimination cases and had been applied
to ECOA cases by analogy. See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030-32 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (effects test applied in ECOA case).
129. 688 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982).




Service, the court found that a creditor violated the ECOA by refusing to
make a second loan to a person unless she first released a TILA claim she
had against the creditor in connection with the first loan. 3 ' In another case,
Anderson v. United Finance Co., the court held that requiring a spouse's
signature on loan documents, when an applicant is individually qualified for
the loan, is discriminatory and violates the ECOA even where the credit was
not denied. 32 Thus, ECOA violations can appear in situations where a layman
might logically think there was no discrimination.
Liability and Defenses
The liability for ECOA violations can be substantial. A creditor who fails
to comply with the provisions of the ECOA is liable to the applicant for any
actual damages sustained, punitive damages in an amount not to exceed
$10,000, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee.'33 Actual damages may in-
clude damages for embarrassment, humiliation, mental distress, and injury
to reputation and creditworthiness. 34 Although punitive damages are not
limited by the ECOA or Regulation B, ECOA section 706(b) (15 U.S.C. §
169le(b)) provides that the court, in awarding punitive damages, should con-
sider the amount of actual damages, the frequency and persistence of viola-
tions by the creditor, the resources of the creditor, the number of persons
adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance
was intentional. Courts construing section 706(b) have held that punitive
damages may only be awarded if (1) the creditor wantonly, maliciously, or
oppressively discriminates against an applicant, or (2) the creditor acts in a
reckless disregard of the law even though there was no specific intent to
discriminate on unlawful grounds. 35 However, there is no requirement that
there be any showing of actual damages to entitle the applicant to punitive
damages.' 36 Thus, a banker who violates the ECOA can face significant ac-
tual damages, potential punitive damages, and substantial attorney fees.
Fortunately, the ECOA provides the creditor with some defenses. The statute
of limitations for bringing an action for a violation is two years. 37 As with
the TILA, though, a violation can continue to be raised as a defense after
the two-year statute of limitations has expired.' 38 Another defense provided
by the ECOA is that a creditor is not liable for any action taken in good
faith conformity with any rule, regulation, or interpretation of the Federal
Reserve Board.' 39 Also, Regulation B provides that a failure to give notice
131. 476 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. La. 1979). The prohibited basis for denying the credit was the
applicant's good faith exercise of her rights under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
132. 666 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1982).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1982).
134. Shuman v. Standard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
135. See, e.g., Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982); Shuman
v. Standard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
136. Anderson, 666 F.2d at 1278.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (1982).
138. In re Remington, 19 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(e) (1982).
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under section 202.9 of reasons for adverse action will not constitute a viola-
tion when caused by an inadvertent error, provided that, upon discovery, the
creditor corrects the error and commences compliance.'4 0 Hence, the creditor
is provided with a few routes to escape liability, but the surest solution ap-
pears to be continuing compliance.
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
The FCRA deals mainly with consumer reporting agencies and consumer
reports.' 4 ' Banks, then, will not usually meet the definition of either of these
special statutory terms.' 42 However, section 615 of the FCRA establishes cer-
tain requirements for users of consumer reports, and banks certainly fall within
this category. Therefore, a banker needs to be aware of these requirements
to avoid liability under the Act.
Section 615 provides that whenever credit for personal, family, or household
purposes is denied or the charge for such credit is increased because of infor-
mation cortained in a consumer report from a consumer reporting agency,
the creditor must supply the consumer with the name and address of the con-
sumer reporting agency making the report."" Whenever such information is
supplied by someone other than a consumer reporting agency, the creditor
must disclose to the consumer his right to request a statement of the nature
of the information.' 4 Thus, the FCRA imposes disclosure requirements on
the users of consumer reports. These requirements are in addition to the state-
ment of reasons required under the ECOA.
The penalties for violation of the disclosure requirements can be substan-
tial. If the user of the information willfully fails to comply, he is liable to
the consumer for any actual damages sustained, such punitive damages as
the court may award, and costs of the action together with a reasonable at-
torney's fee.'s If the user's noncompliance is due to negligence, the consumer
is not entitled to punitive damages. 46 Once again, the prudent banker should
140. 12 C.:F.R. § 202.14(c) (1987).
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982).
142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b-16811 deals with users of consumer reports and consumer reporting
agencies. A "consumer report" is defined, in part, as any communication by a consumer report-
ing agency bearing on a consumer's creditworthiness, character, etc., which is used as a factor
in determining eligibility for credit to be used primarily for personal, household, or family pur-
poses. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). The term does not include any report containing information solely
as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report, which
is the usual type of report a bank would generate. Id. A "consumer reporting agency" is defined
as any person who for fees or on a nonprofit cooperative basis regularly engages in the practice
of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers
for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties. Id. § 1682a(f). Banks, of course,
do not generally generate credit data for the purpose of furnishing it to third parties. However,
cooperative exchanges of information among banks could bring them under the Act. See Guidelines
for Financial Institutions in Complying with FCRA, 5 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 111,203
(June 18, 1971).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1982).
144. Id. § 1681m(b).
145. Id. § 1681n.




consider the possibility of substantial attorney fees being awarded, even though
the remainder of the recovery is likely to be small. 47
The FCRA does provide a banker or other user of consumer reports one
large defense to liability. The statute provides that no user shall be liable for
failure to give notice to the consumer if he maintained reasonable procedures
to assure compliance with the notice provisions.' 48 Thus, all the banker need
do to insulate himself from liability is make sure that he establishes and main-
tains procedures for giving the necessary notice. Another defense provided
by the statute is that any action for a violation must be brought within two
years from the date on which the liability arises. 49
The FTC, in its reviews of creditor compliance with the FCRA notice re-
quirements, has found many violations." 0 These include failure to provide
disclosures when: (1) the applicant is denied credit because of insufficient credit
history or the total absence of a file at the credit bureau; (2) the credit report
contains negative information, even though the report is only one of several
factors considered by the creditor; (3) a credit scoring system is used, and
the credit report is given a low point total; and (4) the creditor relies on infor-
mation from parties other than credit bureaus."' Also, creditors were found
to fail to give both FCRA and ECOA adverse action disclosures when both
were required. '5  Hence, this area appears to be ripe for future litigation.
Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA)
The FCBA applies to banks and other creditors' billing practices under open-
end credit extensions, i.e., credit card plans or revolving loan accounts.' 3
It does not apply to closed-end transactions.' 54 A violation of the FCBA falls
under the same section of the Consumer Credit Protection Act as does a viola-
tion of the TILA.' Thus, the same potential liabilities apply. Also, the statute
has some other significant provisions which affect consumer credit transactions.
The FCBA provides a procedure for the resolution of billing error disputes. 56
It also prohibits the creditor from making an adverse report to any third party
during the billing error dispute resolution process and requires that after this
147. See generally Rubin, supra note 92.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(c) (1982).
149. Id. § 1681p.
150. Fortney, Consumer Credit Compliance and the Federal Trade Commission: Continuing
the Process of Education and Enforcement, 41 Bus. LAW. 1013, 1018 (1986).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1982).
154. Bailey v. Capital Motors Inc., 307 Md. 343, 513 A.2d 912 (1986).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982). See supra notes 86-109 and accompanying text for a discussion
of potential lender liability.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1982). If within sixty days of sending the consumer a billing statement,
the consumer gives the creditor written notice of a billing error, the creditor must: (1) send a
written acknowledgement of the consumer's statement within thirty days of receipt, and (2) within
two billing cycles of receipt (but not to exceed ninety days), either make the appropriate corrections
to the consumer's account or, after investigation, send the consumer a statement of why the
creditor believes the account to be correct, along with any requested documentary evidence. Id.
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period, if the debt is still disputed, the creditor must so indicate to any third
party to which it reports the credit information. ' An additional penalty for
failure to comply with these provisions is that the creditor forfeits the amount
in dispute up to a maximum of $50.'"
The FCBA. also restricts the card issuer from prohibiting sellers from offer-
ing discounts to the cardholder as an inducement to pay by cash rather than
using the credit card.' 9 Also, the card issuer may not require a seller, as a
condition of participating in the credit card plan, to open an account with
or procure any service from the issuer. 60
In what is probably the most significant provision of the Act, the card issuer
is held subject to all claims (other than tort claims) and defenses arising out
of a credit card transaction if: (1) the consumer has made a good faith at-
tempt to resolve the dispute with the person honoring the credit card; (2) the
amount of the trxansaction exceeds $50; and (3) the transaction occurred within
the same state as the cardholder's last mailing address or was within 100 miles
of such address."' Fortunately, the issuer's liability is limited to the amount
of credit outstanding with respect to the transaction. 26
The FCBA also provides that if an open-end consumer credit plan allows
the consumer to pay a portion of the credit extended and avoid an additional
finance charge, the creditor may not impose an additional finance charge unless
the consumer is mailed a statement that includes the amount upon which the
finance charge will be based at least fourteen days prior to the date specified
in the statement for payment.
63
In sum, the FCBA has some important provisions the banker should con-
sider. In addition to the substantial liability the FCBA can impose, certain
aspects, such as the provision making the credit card issuer subject to any
claims and defenses arising from the underlying transaction, should be con-
sidered by a banker in deciding whether to engage in credit card activities.
Thus, the FCBA serves as an example of a situation where a banker should
consult counsel before offering a new product or service. By consulting counsel,
the banker can be sure that he fully understands all of the potential costs
of the new venture.
Debt Collection Practices Act (DCPA)
Another consumer credit protection statute is the DCPA. '1 It strives to
"eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.""16 It ac-
157. Id. § 1666a.
158. Id. § 1566(e).
159. Id. § 1666f.
160. Id. § 1666g.
161. Id. § 1666!(a). The last two limitations do not apply if the merchant is the card issuer
or in some other related cases.
162. Id. § 1666i(b).
163. Id. § 1666b(a).
164. Id. §§ 1692-1692o.
165. Id. § 1692(e).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss4/15
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complishes this goal by strictly regulating the way in which debt collectors
must conduct their business. A failure to comply with the Act's requirements
can result in the debt collector being liable to the consumer for actual damages,
punitive damages up to $1,000, and costs, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.' 66 The defenses to liability provided by the Act are: (1) unintentional viola-
tion resulting from bona fide error, notwithstanding the maintenance of pro-
cedures to avoid such an error; (2) a one-year statute of limitations for bring-
ing an action under the Act; and (3) actions taken in good faith in conform-
ity with a FTC advisory opinion. 67
It is a relatively simple matter for a bank to avoid liability under the DCPA.
The Act only applies to "debt collectors." A "debt collector" is defined as
a person who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed to another;
however, an officer or employee of the creditor acting in the name of the
creditor is specifically excluded from the definition. 68 On the other hand,
an attorney acting in his professional capacity on behalf of the creditor is
not excluded.'69 The only way a creditor collecting his own debts is considered
a debt collector is if the creditor uses any name other than his own name,
which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect
the debt. 7 Therefore, a bank can avoid falling within the Act's requirements
simply by conducting its collection activities in its own name.
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
The other major federal statute that directly impacts on the extension of
consumer credit is RESPA.'7 ' One of the main purposes of RESPA
is "to insure that consumers throughout the nation are provided with greater
and more timely information on the nature and costs of the settlement pro-
cess and are protected from unnecessary high settlement charges caused by
certain abusive practices that have developed in some areas of the country." 2
RESPA accomplishes its purpose by regulating the settlement process for
"federally related mortgage loans." Mortgage lending by banks falls within
this category because "federally regulated mortgage loans" are defined to in-
clude, among other things, first acquisition loans on residential property that
are made by a lender whose deposits are insured by any agency of the federal
166. Id. § 1692k(a).
167. Id. § 1692k(c), (d), (e).
168. Id. § 1692a(6). See Woocher, An Introduction to Debt Collection Law, 29 PRac. LAw.
31, 33-34 (Oct. 1983).
169. 100 Stat. 768 (1986) amended 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(f) to eliminate attorneys from the
list of those excluded from the definition of "debt collectors." However, in Providence Washington
Ins., 89 F.T.C. 345 (1977), the FTC found that the creditor's use of collection letters sent by
one of the creditor's officers who was also an attorney, on a letterhead that said "Attorney
at Law" with an address and phone number different from the company's, was a misrepresenta-
tion under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
171. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1982).
172. Id. § 2601(a).
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government (i.e., the FDIC).173 Thus, RESPA will apply to banks when
they make acquisition first mortgage loans on residential real estate.
The Act requires that lenders provide all applicants for residential acquisi-
tion loans with a HUD booklet on settlement costs and a good faith estimate
of those costs.'74 Then, a uniform HUD settlement statement itemizing all
charges imposed on the buyer and seller must generally be provided at or
before closing.' 75 Also, the Act prohibits kickbacks and unearned fees for
referring business incident to a real estate settlement." Additionally,
RESPA limits the amount of advance deposits that may be required for escrow
accounts. The escrow deposit to pay taxes, insurance, and other charges related
to settlement is limited to an amount sufficient to pay such charges from the
last date on which the charges would normally be paid to the date of the
first payment on the mortgage, plus one-sixth of the total estimated charges
to be paid during the ensuing twelve-month period. 77 The monthly escrow
deposits beginning with the first payment are then limited to one-twelfth of
the amount of insurance, taxes, and other charges reasonably estimated to
be paid during the ensuing twelve months, plus one-sixth of the amount
estimated to be paid during the ensuing twelve-month period.1
7
In sum, RESPA imposes certain requirements with respect to residen-
tial acquisition lending. However, the Act provides for no private right of
action in most cases. Even if a lender fails to meet all of the Act's requirements,
it does not impose liability for anything other than kickbacks and referral fees.
State Consumer Credit Legislation
The primary focus of this comment is on the impact of federal consumer
credit legislation on the banking industry. However, the discussion of the poten-
tial liabilities a banker faces in consumer lending would not be complete
without at least a brief discussion of some of the pertinent state consumer
credit legislation, the most common of which are the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code (UCCC or Code), or statutes that cover the same subjects, and usury
statutes (the UCCC contains its own usury provisions). Although there are
various other state statutes that may deal with consumer credit, 79 this discus-
173. Id. § 2602(1).
174. Id. § 2604(c), (d).
175. Id. § 2603.
176. Id. § 2607. A violation of this provision can result in a fine of up to $10,000 and up
to a year in prison. Also, the violators are liable for an amount equal to three times the fee,
along with costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Id. A one-year statute of limitations applies
to an action for damages under this section. Id. § 2614.
177. Id. § 2609.
178. Id.
179. For example, Oklahoma has its own equal credit opportunity law (14A OKLA. STAT. §
1-109 (1981)); but it is phrased only in general terms without any specific mechanical detail.
Also, there is no private right to enforcement under Oklahoma's law. See Miller, supra note
112, at 245, 247. But see Note, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: Guarantors As Applicants-
Did the Cost of a Violation Go Up?, 40 OKRA. L. REv. 413 (1987), which suggests that the
Oklahoma law may be raised as a defense to liability in an action on the underlying obligation.




sion will be limited to the UCCC and usury statutes because these types of
statutes are more prevalent.'80
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC)
According to one commentator, the drafters of the UCCC "sought to pro-
tect less knowledgeable and less sophisticated credit recipients by restricting
certain credit practices and abuses, putting ceilings on the price of credit,
enhancing debtor rights and remedies, and providing administrative enforce-
ment tools as well as judicial remedies for redress of Code violations."''
The Code applies to consumer credit transactions, including, among other
things, consumer loans. A "consumer loan" is defined as a loan by a creditor
regularly engaged in the business of making loans in which: (1) the debtor
is a person other than an organization; (2) the debt is incurred primarily for
a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose; (3) the debt is payable
in installments or a finance charge is made; and (4) the amount financed does
not exceed $25,000 or the debt (other than one for an agricultural purpose)
is secured by an interest in land.'82 A consumer loan does not include a loan
secured by an interest in land in which the finance charge does not exceed
12 percent.' 8 3 These are essentially the same requirements as those for the
TILA, except for the 12 percent rule and the exclusion of agriculture loans.
Thus, the typical bank's consumer lending will fall within the scope of the
UCCC.
The UCCC has disclosure and rescission provisions similar to those under
the TILA.'84 Also, the UCCC has provisions setting the maximum permis-
sible finance charge for consumer and other loans. 'ss Although there are also
provisions limiting the imposition of late charges on precomputed consumer
credit transactions, this limitation has diminished importance today because
banks seldom make precomputed loans. 8 6 However, the most significant pro-
visions of the UCCC are those regulating agreements and practices.
In addition to TILA-type disclosures, the UCCC also provides that a
cosigner, comaker, or guarantor is not liable unless he receives a separate
notification of his obligation with respect to the debt.'17 Also, a creditor is
180. States that have not adopted the UCCC have at least four, and as many as eight or
ten, different consumer credit laws of varying kinds; but they often cover the same subjects:
disclosure, usury, practices, and remedies. Murane, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code on the Banking Industry, 90 BAiNdn. L.J. 265, 266 (1973).
181. Id. at 269.
182. U.C.C.C. § 1.301(15) (1974).
183. Id.
184. Id. §§ 3.201, 5.203. See also Murane, supra note 180, at 270.
185. U.C.C.C. §§ 2.201, 2.202, 2.401, 2.601. The various rates and levels at which they apply
are many and beyond the scope of this comment. Some of these rules and other state usury
provisions may not apply to banks under 12 U.S.C. § 85 and DIDA, §§ 501 & 521. See Gelb,
Recent Usury Law Developments, 42 Bus. LAw. 915, 912-26 (1987).
186. U.C.C.C. § 2.502. A "precomputed consumer credit transaction" is a transaction in whichthe debt is comprised of the amount financed and the amount of the finance charge computed
in advance. Id. § 1.301(33).
187. Id. § 3.208.
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prohibited from taking an irrevocable assignment of earnings of the consumer
as payment on a debt or as security for payment.'88 Likewise, a consumer
may not authorize any person to confess judgment on a claim arising out
of a consumer credit transaction.'8 9 Additionally, depending on the version
of the UCCC a state adopts, the UCCC either restricts or limits a creditor
from including a provision in the credit agreement requiring the consumer
to pay the creditor's attorney fees.190 If any of these provisions are present,
they are unenforceable. 9 Finally, if the loan provides for a balloon payment,
defined as a payment more than twice as large as the average of earlier
payments, the consumer has the right to refinance the balloon without penalty
under terms equally favorable to those in the original loan. 92
One of the most significant provisions of the UCCC is section 3.404. This
section makes an assignee subject to all of the consumer's claims and defenses
against the seller or lessor that arise out of the sale or lease of property or
services, notwithstanding that the assignee is a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument. Thus, the UCCC eliminates the holder in due course
doctrine for consumer credit sales and leases.' 9 Similarly, section 3.405 pro-
vides that a lender who makes a consumer loan to enable the consumer to
buy or lease particular property or services is subject to the consumer's claims
and defenses arising from the sale or lease if one of several conditions are
present that indicates lender participation in the underlying transaction. Hence,
the UCCC imposes liability on banks as assignees for the acts of certain third
parties.
With respect to the creditor's remedies, the UCCC imposes a duty on the
creditor to give the consumer a written notice of his right to cure as a precon-
dition to taking action on the obligation.19 The consumer has twenty days
after the notice is given to cure. 95 Cure will then restore the consumer to
his rights under the agreement as though no default had occurred. 96 Also,
the creditor may not use self-help repossession to enforce his security interest
in certain cases, and judicial process may not even be available. 97 The con-
188. Id. § 3.305.
189. Id. § 3.306. The Federal Reserve Board Credit Practices Rules also cover much of this
same ground.
190. Id. § 2.507 (Alternative A or B). See also Murane, supra note 180, at 276.
191. U.C.C.C. §§ 3.305, 3.306.
192. Id. § 3.308.
193. Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumer's Claims
and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1987), has much the same effect, requiring a contractual provi-
sion giving the consent of the holder to the assertion of claims or defenses by the consumer.
194. U.C.C.C. § 5.110.
195. Id. § 5.111.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 5.116. The lender may not, without a court order, repossess goods in which it has
a nonpurchase money security interest where goods are possessed by the consumer, being used
by the consumer or a member of his family, are or may be exempt from execution, and are
collateral for a "supervised loan" (as defined by § 1.301(43)). The court may not order process
if it finds that the consumer lacks the means to pay all or part of the debt secured and the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss4/15
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sumer's remedies and creditor's defenses for failure to comply or to make
TILA-type disclosures are similar to those under the TILA.18
In sum, the UCCC imposes some additional burdens on the banker with
respect to his consumer lending transactions. Possibly the most significant
change made by the UCCC is its elimination of the holder in due course doc-
trine in section 3.404. This provision will force banks to look more closely
into the business practices of firms from which they buy consumer paper.
Also, it will force banks to take steps such as establishing higher reserves
for merchants from which they buy paper and buying more paper on a recourse
basis in order to protect themselves.199
Usury
Usury statutes in non-UCCC states are often separate from other consumer
credit legislation and usually set a maximum permissible rate of interest that
can be charged on loan contracts. These statutes were enacted to protect con-
sumers and others from what state legislatures believed were unreasonably
high interest rates on loans. Violations of usury provisions can result in fines,
forfeiture of interest, and unenforceability of the entire contract. The advent
of the maximum interest rate provisions of the UCCC °0 and federal
preemption through the DIDA °' have severely limited the possibility of usury
violations under current market conditions. However, if interest rates go up
dramatically in the future, usury may again become something that bankers
must consider.
Conclusion
This comment has discussed the major federal and state consumer credit
legislation. These provisions are obviously complex and contain many nuances.
Violations of these statutes can result in substantial liability to a bank or other
financial institution. In light of the complexity inherent in these statutes and
the potential liability involved, bankers should get the advice of informed
counsel early in the loan process and not wait until something goes wrong,
as is usually the case. By getting the advice of counsel on potential credit
extensions and proposed programs and products, the bank can avoid poten-
tial liability arising from its consumer lending practices and avoid having to
scramble for defenses once a claim arises. The optimal way for a bank to
accomplish this goal is to have its counsel attend its board meetings, its policy
committee meetings, and its loan committee meetings. Increasingly, consumers
who are unable to pay their debts are looking to the consumer credit statutes
continued use and possession of the item is necessary to avoid undue hardship for the consumer
or a member of his family. Id.
198. Id. §§ 5.202, 5.203.
199. Murane, supra note 180, at 275.
200. U.C.C.C. §§ 2.201, 2.202, 2.401, 2.601 (regulate maximum permissible finance charge
in consumer credit transactions).
201. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3524 (1982). See also Luttrell, Usury Limits and Federal Pre-emption,
in CONSUMER CREDrr GOING NTO THE 80's, 313 (1981).
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for a way out-either as a bargaining chip or as an offset against liability.
It is time for banks to take positive action to decrease their exposure to these
tactics. One such step is increased involvement by the bank's attorney in its
consumer lending practice.
Scott A. Meacham
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